The Art of War Full Translated by Lionel Giles

We provide information, advice, and guidance (IAG) on a wide range of military, health, and fitness-related topics.

Last Updated: 28 Feb, 2016

1.0     Introduction

"No plan survives contact with the enemy."

I first came into contact with the to a higher place quotation whilst serving with the British Ground forces, it was bandied about during several courses I participated in; although, at the time I did not realise that information technology is merely a breviloquent version of a more than nuanced quotation past one of, arguably, the greatest armed services planners/strategists of modern times (more almost him later on).

Nevertheless, the quotation in its various forms has been accredited to a variety of well-known characters, for example: Colin Powell (US General during the first Gulf War); Dwight D. Eisenhower (a WW2 General); Helmuth von Molkte (a German Field Align); The Duke of Wellington (a British General during the Napoleonic wars); Carl von Clausewitz (perennial military theorist); Sun Tzu (The Art of War); and even Napoleon Bonaparte himself (evidently a one-time French bigwig).

In truth they will all have thought, if not said, it to some degree. That quote has at one time or another too been referred to as i of the following: an old military adage; armed forces truism; one of the nigh bones axioms of modern war; time-honoured military dictum; and Potato's Law of gainsay operations (currently being  compiled).

"Nil is certain but expiry and taxes." (Martin, 2015).

The purpose of this article is to provide some pregnant, context, background and history to the quote; it is not intended to be all-encompassing or definitive. Links and access to documents for further reading or more in-depth analysis is provided for this purpose.

"A perfect tactical plan is like a unicorn because anyone can tell you lot what i looks like, only no i has actually always seen one." (Unknown)

ii.0     Variations on a Theme

There are a number of variations of the in a higher place quote floating around the net and literature, a few of which are highlighted below:

• No battle plan survives contact with the enemy.
• No programme e'er survives contact with the enemy.
• No battle plan always survived first contact with the enemy.
• No plan survives the first shot.
• No programme survives first contact with the enemy.
• No plan survives its initial implementation.
• "No program survives contact with the enemy." (Barnett, 1963, p.35).
• "No battle programme ever survives contact with the enemy." (Detzer, 2005, p.233).

However merely like the primary quote, all of its variants are just pithy progeny of the original quotation which we can now wait at.

3.0     The Moltke Quotation

Field Marshal Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke (26 October 1800 to 24 April 1891) was Chief of Staff of the Prussian General Staff from 1857 to 1871 so of the Cracking Full general Staff from 1871 to 1888. He was an architect of Germany's Wars of Unification (1864 to 1871). He is often referred to as Moltke the Elderberry to distinguish him from his nephew, Helmuth Johann Ludwig von Moltke (the Younger). He is also considered, by some, to maybe be the most committed disciple of Clausewitz (discussed below) and considered by many equally the most brilliant armed services person since Napoleon.

The context for Moltke's quotation is his essay 'Ueber Strategie' or On Strategy, written in 1871 as part of Militarische Werke (Military Works). Moltke (1900, p.291-292) wrote:

"The material and moral consequences of every major boxing are so far-reaching that they ordinarily bring well-nigh a completely altered situation, a new footing for the adoption of new measures. One cannot exist at all sure that whatsoever operational programme will survive the first encounter with the principal body of the enemy. Only a layman could suppose that the development of a campaign represents the strict application of a prior concept that has been worked out in every detail and followed through to the very end."

Moltke and so continues:

"Certainly the commander in chief will keep his great objective continuously in mind, undisturbed by the vicissitudes of events. Just the path on which he hopes to reach information technology can never be firmly established in advance. Throughout the entrada he must make a series of decisions on the footing of situations that cannot be foreseen. The successive acts of war are thus not premeditated designs, but on the contrary are spontaneous acts guided by military measures. Everything depends on penetrating the uncertainty of veiled situations to evaluate the facts, to analyze the unknown, to make decisions rapidly, and and then to acquit them out with strength and continuance."

3.1     Variations of the Moltke Quotation

'As military strategists go Duke, you're not exactly Alexander the Great.'

At that place are a number of variations of Moltke'southward quotation, highlighted beneath, which is, in office, due to how researchers and academics have translated from German to English.

• "No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the kickoff run across with the enemy'south main strength."
• "The tactical consequence of an engagement forms the base for new strategic decisions considering victory or defeat in a battle changes the situation to such a degree that no human acumen is able to see beyond the first battle."
• "No operations programme will ever extend with any sort of certainty across the commencement run across with the hostile main force." (Tsouras, 2000, p.363).
• "No functioning extends with whatsoever certainty beyond the starting time run across with the main body of the enemy." (Keyes, due north.d.).
• "[No] plan of operations extends with whatever certainty beyond the starting time contact with the main hostile strength." (Keyes, 2006, p.xi).

"'That will depend on the enemy, sir. They might want to get stuck in nonetheless, despite our plans. That's one thing in life the army teaches y'all early on: the other side doesn't always play forth with the programme.'." (Scarrow, 2015, p.279).

4.0     Moltke Was Not the First

Although Moltke may accept given u.s. the original quotation, the principles behind it where elucidated by other famous characters before him.

Simply iii personalities are discussed in this section (Carl von Clausewitz, Napoleon Bonaparte and Sunday Tzu) because they, through research, are the about closely associated with Moltke's quote (i.e. they are incorrectly credited with the original quote).

4.1     Carl von Clausewitz

Carl Philipp Gottfried (or Gottlieb) von Clausewitz (01 June 1780 to sixteen Nov 1831) was a Prussian general and war machine theorist who stressed the 'moral' (psychological in the modern colloquial) and political aspects of war. His most notable work, Vom Kriege (On State of war), was unfinished at his decease but published posthumously in 1832.

Every bit role of his writings, Clausewitz stressed the demand to sympathise a range of diverse factors in the planning and comport of war, such as how unexpected developments unfolding nether the Nebel des Krieges or 'fog of state of war' (though he did not coin the phrase) called for rapid decisions by alert commanders (situational awareness). In fog, Clausewitz (1989, p.101) meant doubt:

"State of war is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or bottom uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth."

Clausewitz then goes on to state (1989, p.101-102):

"War is the realm of run a risk. No other human action gives it greater scope: no other has such incessant and varied dealings with this intruder. Chance makes everything more uncertain and interferes with the whole course of events. Since all information and assumptions are open to incertitude, and with adventure at piece of work everywhere, the commander continually finds that things are non as he expected. This is spring to influence his plans, or at least the assumptions underlying them. If this influence is sufficiently powerful to cause a change in his plans, he must ordinarily work out new ones; simply for these the necessary information may non be immediately available. During an operation, decisions accept usually to be made at once: there may exist no time to review the state of affairs or even to call up it through. Ordinarily, of course, new data and reevaluation are not enough to brand us give up our intentions: they only telephone call them into question. We now know more, but this makes u.s.a. more, not less uncertain. The latest reports practise not go far all at in one case: they merely trickle in. They continually impinge on our decisions, and our mind must be permanently armed, so to speak, to deal with them."

Clausewitz (1989, p.103) as well talked about 'presence of mind' in which he stated:

"This must play a great part in war, the domain of the unexpected, since information technology is cypher but an increased capacity of dealing with the unexpected."

Prior to writing 'On War', Clausewitz had written an essay (in 1812) for his pupil, the sixteen twelvemonth sometime Prussian Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm (later King Friedrich Wilhelm Iv, r.1840 to 1858) whose war machine tutor he had get in 1810. The essay was titled: Dice wichtigsten Grundsätze des Kriegführens zur Ergänzung meines Unterrichts bei Sr. Königlichen Hoheit dem Kronprinzen or The about important principles of the fine art of war to complete my course of teaching for his Royal Highness the Crown Prince. Even so, the essay is historically referred to as the Principles of War.

In the essay Clausewitz (2003, p.63-64) states:

"We must, therefore, be confident that the full general measures we have adopted will produce the results nosotros wait. [and] If we take made appropriate preparations, taking into business relationship all possible misfortunes, and then that nosotros shall not exist lost immediately if they occur, nosotros must boldly accelerate into the shadows of uncertainty."

The essay represented Clausewitz's theoretical evolution up to that point (1812) and was translated into a form suitable for the audience (a 16-year old). It has also, on occasion, been viewed as a summary of Clausewitz's mature theory but with hindsight it was only a forerunner for his magnum opus (or smashing piece of work) 'On War'.

According to Beatrice Heuser (2002, p.89), Clausewitz "…wrote that no state of war plan outlasts the first encounter with the enemy, a view that was echoed by Moltke." However, Terence Holmes (2007, p.129) argues "That is indeed a well-known opinion of Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke's, only information technology is not a quotation from Clausewitz." Clausewitz, from the books I have read, certainly did non originate the quote, Moltke did. However, afterward reading Clausewitz's On War and the Principles of War, I tin see the foundations beingness laid for Moltke's quote.

4.2     Napoleon Bonaparte

Napoleon Bonaparte was a French armed forces and political leader who rose to prominence during the French Revolution and its associated wars. Every bit Napoleon I, he was Emperor of the French from 1804 until 1814, and over again in 1815.

"Je n'ai jamais eu un program d'opérations." (Chandler, 2009, p.134).

This is translated as "I have never had a programme of operations." Chandler suggests that this meant that Napoleon was never dominated past a difficult and fast programme worked out in advance. This is probably a truism, but it is well-known that Berthier, Napoleon'due south primary of staff, translated Napoleon'southward vision in a well-coordinated plan (Zabecki, 2008a; Chandler, 2009).

There are a plethora of quotes, supposedly, attributed to Napoleon which can be linked to our main quote. Nonetheless, the trouble for me is that they are uncited and perennially duplicated across the internet (as if that makes them existent and truthful). Anyway, below is a mix of cited and uncited quotations.

• "Forethought we may take, undoubtedly, but non foresight."
• "Take time to deliberate, only when the fourth dimension for action has arrived, stop thinking and get in."
• "The torment of precautions ofttimes exceeds the dangers to be avoided. It is sometimes amend to abandon one's self to destiny."
• "Nothing is more difficult, and therefore more than precious, than to exist able to decide."
• "If the fine art of war were nothing but the art of avoiding risks, glory would get the casualty of mediocre minds …[and]… I accept made all the calculations; fate will do the rest." Argument at the offset of the 1813 campaign, equally quoted in The Listen of Napoleon (1955, p.45) translated by J. Christopher Herold.
• Napoleon: In His Own Words (1916) edited past Jules Bertaut, as translated by Herbert Edward Law and Charles Lincoln Rhodes:
  • "The laws of circumstance are abolished past new circumstances." (Bonaparte, 1916, p.48).
  • "A commander in primary ought to say to himself several times a day: If the enemy should appear on my front, on my right, on my left, what would I do? And if the question finds him uncertain, he is not well placed, he is not as he should be, and he should remedy information technology." (Bonaparte, 1916, p.118).
  • "In war, theory is all right so far equally general principles are concerned; just in reducing general principles to practise at that place will ever be danger. Theory and do are the axis almost which the sphere of accomplishment revolves. (Bonaparte, 1916, p.124).

iv.3     Sun Tzu

Sun Tzu was a Chinese military machine full general, strategist and philosopher who lived in ancient China (544BC to 496BC). He is traditionally credited as the author of The Art of War, an extremely influential ancient Chinese book on military strategy. Sun Tzu has had a significant impact on Chinese and Asian history and culture, both as the writer of The Art of State of war and as a legendary historical figure.

In the Art of State of war as translated by Lionel Giles, Sunday Tzu provides the reader with two statements that tin be associated with Moltke'southward quote:

"If you know the enemy and know yourself, yous need not fright the results of a hundred battles. If you know yourself only not the enemy, for every victory gained you will besides suffer a defeat. If you lot know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle." (Sun Tzu, 2009, p.10).

"The general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes merely few calculations beforehand. Thus exercise many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: How much more no calculation at all! Information technology is past attending to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose." (Sun Tzu, 2009, p101).

4.4     Modern Awarding

Elizabeth Knowles, in her 2006 (p.n.k.) book What They Didn't Say: A Book of Misquotations, provides us with a modern twist of Moltke's quotation:

"No plan survives first contact with the enemy: A piece of military wisdom deriving from a formulation past the nineteenth-century Prussian military commander Helmuth van Moltke. He wrote in 1880, "No plan of operations reaches with whatever certainty beyond the get-go encounter with the enemy'due south main force." The warning has been further modified, every bit in Sean Naylor's commodity on Operation Anaconda (the chase for Osama bin Laden) in Afghanistan, published in the New York Times of March 2003: "That the operation didn't go as planned is no disgrace. It is a cliché that no plan survives the beginning shot fired, just information technology is no less true for beingness i."

I as well institute this quotation by Mike Tyson (Berardino, 2012) which I recollect is quite amusing:

"Everyone has a program until they go punched in the oral cavity."

An article on the origins of the quote tin be found here.

v.0     Factors Affecting Moltke's Quotation

In that location are a number of factors that tin can have an touch on Moltke'south quotation (the inference being why a commander's plan may not work), some of which are highlighted below:

• Uncertainty nearly the antagonist:
  • Intention (both political and military).
  • Structure, force and disposition of offensive and defensive assets.
  • Capabilities.
  • Logistical force.
  • Strategic modelling and data derived from open-source intelligence.
  • Accuracy of ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Conquering and Reconnaissance) picture.
  • Effects of counter-intelligence (active deception, subversion and/or electronic attack on communications).
  • Ability of antagonist intelligence to nowadays a superior flick assuasive one's ain controlling bicycle to be compromised.
• Uncertainty about the natural environment:
  • Weather and meteorological aspects.
  • Terrain (style of transport, terrain to cantankerous, distance etc.).
• Dubiousness near friendly forces:
  • Upwards to date information on construction, strength, capabilities and disposition of own offensive and defensive assets.
  • Unreported fabric deficiencies or concerns (which tin can lead to an optimistic view of own capabilities).
  • Ain directive uncertainty emanating from the yard strategic or armed forces strategic levels (i.e. the commander not having the full sight/grasp of the strategic imperative).
  • Delays in advice at the tactical or operational level, and the ebb and flow of ain force, and adversary force, interaction.

The practical application of dubiety is nearly easily demonstrated in the tactical battlespace. It may include a military commander'south incomplete or inaccurate intelligence about the adversary's numbers, disposition, capabilities, intent, features of the battlefield, and incomplete knowledge of the state of their own forces. Uncertainty can be caused past the limits of reconnaissance, by the adversary's feints/deceptions and disinformation, by delays in receiving intelligence and difficulties in passing orders, and past the difficult chore of forming a denoting picture from a very large (or very small) amount of various data.

When a force engages in combat and the urgency for good intelligence increases, so does incertitude and the anarchy of the battlefield, while military units go preoccupied with fighting or are lost (either destroyed by enemy burn or literally lose their fashion), reconnaissance and liaison elements become unavailable, the minimum distance for effective communication increases, and sometimes real fog and fume obscure vision (hence obscuring advice).

More on incertitude can be establish in the Useful Documents section.

6.0     Contrasting Quotation

"Prior Training and Planning Prevents Piss Poor Performance."

Colloquially known, to me, in the armed forces as the 7Ps (or the 6Ps if i omits the colourful metaphor!), information technology means that commanders take to make some sort of program for what they are going to exercise; the level of military planning depending on task role and time constraints.

For instance, Western armed forces organisations employ the NATO Orders Process for the production of an operational program (or orders) and this incorporates the use of the abbreviated term SOPs (or standard operating procedures) when issuing those orders.

Even so, SOPs can exist mean different things to different people and they are also contextual. For instance, the SOP for encountering a numerically superior adversary is different from that of a numerically junior adversary; numerically superior/junior beingness contextual based on the size of your own force (amongst other factors).

Farther, a commander's interpretation of the various factors identified in the previous section volition also have an bear on on the conception of their plan and subsequent SOPs. Moltke understood that military planning was an important process in the preparation (and conduct) of state of war, and understanding one's adversary or adversaries and their strengths, weaknesses and likely courses of action was a military imperative. Assay by war machine historians would suggest that he managed to do this pretty well! (Gorlitz, 1953; Zabecki, 2008a).

vii.0     Collaborative Planning and Situation Awareness

Development of the concept, and a framework (Gorman et al., 2006) of collaborative planning (activeness prior to the operation) and state of affairs awareness (action during the operation) has been an important step in ameliorating the effects of our quote. Withal, a number of commentators stress the complexity and change that can occur within the armed forces environment due to heterogeneous and distributed factors (Gorman et al., 2006; Riley et al., 2006).

Another element to mix into the pot of collaborative planning and situation awareness is lessons learned (mail service-operation); probably best analogised as reflection to non-war machine readers.

George Santayana (16 December 1863 to 26 September 1952), who was a philosopher, essayist, poet and novelist, is well-known for the following quote (which also enjoys a number of variations) (Santayana & Project Gutenberg, 2005):

"Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentivity. When change is absolute at that place remains no being to improve and no direction is set for possible improvement: and when experience is not retained, equally among savages, infancy is perpetual. Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."

However, every bit is the style of words, someone else said information technology earlier. Edmund Burke (12 January 1729 to 09 July 1797), a British statesman and philosopher, wrote (Shush & Project Gutenberg, 2013):

"In history a groovy volume is unrolled for our education, drawing the materials of time to come wisdom from the by errors and infirmities of flesh."

Shush is also credited, on a number of websites, with the following quote (although I take yet to find a credible source): "Those who don't know history are destined to repeat information technology."

"History doesn't echo itself, just it does rhyme." This is often attributed to Mark Twain and its origin is discipline to contend (Quote Investigator, 2014; Wikipedia, 2014).

Playing devil's advocate, Burke is also alleged to accept written the following to a Member of the National Assembly in 1791 (Wikipedia, 2015):

"You tin can never plan the hereafter by the past."

I suspect the best (or at least well-known) case of this collaboration of prior planning and hereafter guesswork is D-Twenty-four hour period on 06 June 1945, aka Operation Overlord. The training for D-24-hour interval was undertaken, in some class, over a period of years and comprehensive plans were fatigued upwards (Zabecki, 2008b). A critical element of the plan concerned German resistance, equally the Germans had created a fortified line of defence force beyond Northern France. On D-Day information technology became credible that some elements of the plan regarding resistance were way out; on some beaches soldiers literally strolled across the embankment with no Germans in sight whilst on other beaches soldiers where 'bogged downwardly' for days and the casualty toll was horrendous.

Military machine planning would seem antagonistic, near anathema, to the chaos that is seemingly created by the above quotes. Nevertheless, some sort of planning prior to the operation is required (fifty-fifty if it is but a few minutes earlier setting upward a snap deadfall). If a commander has not adult an appreciation for their adversary before the operation, then the operation may deliver a fatal lesson. Also, lessons learned from previous encounters can also assistance to influence the event of the functioning (preferably in your favour).

The current iteration of collaborative planning and situation awareness, for the Americans, is known as the Adaptive Planning and Execution (Apex) enterprise (CJCS, 2015; Santacroce, 2015), which is a "…family of documents [that] provide the standard policies and procedures to plan for and execute military activities." (CJCS, 2015, p.A-1).

When analysing the APEX framework it is worth noting that situation awareness is, from the American perspective, i of four operational activities for commanders to appreciate (the other 3 being planning, execution and cess).

8.0     Summary

Who said what quote is largely academic and (somewhat) irrelevant, the meaning behind them is the important betoken. If a commander lacks appreciation for their own forces, their adversary's capabilities and intent, the chance of the quote existence realised is greatly enhanced.

Planning prior to an operation is important to ensure the right personnel and materials etc. are in the right position, but so is adapting to the state of affairs on the ground once the operation starts. Finally, learning lessons from history is essential otherwise a commander will end up making the same error as Napoleon and Hitler!

9.0     Useful Documents, Links and References

9.ane     Useful Documents

• On War Without the Fog (Kiesling, 2001), who talks nearly Clausewitz's use of the words fog and friction.
• Fog of War, Effects of Dubiety on Airpower Employment (Shepherd, 1997).
• British Army Doctrine Publication, Operations (2010-12).
• Joint Doctrine Publication 04, Understanding (2010-12).
• JSP 912 – Human being Factors Integration for Defense Systems, v2i (2013-06-25).
• Combat State of affairs Awareness… (Murray et al, 2010).
• Friction, Anarchy & Orders – Clauswitz, Boyd & Command Approaches (Samuels, 2014).
• Armed services Psychology, State of affairs Sensation (Kass, 2009).
• Napoleon, In his Own Words (Napoleon, 1916).
• On War, Affiliate 1 & viii (Clausewitz, 1989).
• Planning versus Chaos in Clausewitz's On War (Holmes, 2007).
• Preparing Soldiers for Uncertainty (Due et al., 2015).
• Principles of War (Clausewitz, 1812).
• Simulating the Fog of War (Setear, 1989).
• Sensemaking, Concluding Report (Leedom, 2001).
• Measurement of Situation Awareness In A C4ISR Experiment (French & Hutchinson, 2002).
• Organizing Ambiguity, A Grounded Theory of Leadership & Sensemaking within Dangerous Contexts (Bran & Scott, 2010).
• Functional Assay of the Next Generation Common Operating Picture (Leedom, north.d.).
• Operational Risk Direction (Marine Corps Institute, 2002).
• Situational Awareness (Data) Bases in Military Control & Control (Sandor, 2004).
• Microblogging During Two Natural Hazards Events: What Twitter May Contribute to Situational Sensation (Vieweg et al., 2010).
• Chapter 2 The Evolving Definition of Cerebral Readiness for Armed services Operations (Fletcher & Wind, 2014).
• An Empirical Study of the Relationship between Situation Awareness & Decision Making (Stanners & French, 2005).
• Coordinated Sensation of Situation by Teams (Gorman et al., 2006).
• Recent Human Factors Contributions to Better Military Operations (Andrews et al., 2003).
• A Man Factors Approach to Analysing Military Control & Control (Walker et al., 2010).
• Adaptive Planning & Execution Overview & Policy Framework (JCS, 2015-05-29).

9.2     Useful Links and Other Stuff

• Military Operations Research Order (MORS): http://www.mors.org/
• The Journal of Armed services Operations (TJOMO): https://www.tjomo.com/
• The Centre for Police force and Military Operations (CLAMO): http://world wide web.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/CLAMO.html
• Clausewitz Dedicated website: http://world wide web.clausewitz.com.
• McKay, B. & McKay, Grand. (2015) How to Develop the Situational Awareness of Jason Bourne. Available from World wide web: http://www.artofmanliness.com/2015/02/05/how-to-develop-the-situational-awareness-of-jason-bourne/. [Accessed: 05 September, 2015].
• Adaptive Planning and Execution (Noon) for U.S. Joint Forces Command: http://www.icfi.com/insights/projects/defense/adaptive-planning-and-execution-for-us-joint-forces-command.
• Volume: 'Embracing the Fog of War: Assessment and Metrics in Counterinsurgency' by Ben Connable (2012, RAND Corporation).
• PPT: 'Closing the Gap between Strategic Development and Strategic Execution' by Richard Rierson. Available from World wide web: http://www.slideshare.net/WMCCCommunications/closing-the-gap-between-strategic-evolution-strategic-execution-by-richard-rierson. [Accessed: 08 September, 2015].
• 'Efficient Furnishings-based Military Planning' sponsored past the Army Research Part. Bachelor from World Wide Web: http://www.ecse.rpi.edu/~cvrl/EBO/ebo.htm. [Accessed: 08 September, 2015].

9.three     References

Barnett, C. (1963) The Swordbearers: Studies in Supreme Control in the First World State of war. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode.

Berardino, M. (2012) Mike Tyson Explains 1 Of His Most Famous Quotes. Available from Www: http://manufactures.dominicus-sentinel.com/2012-11-09/sports/sfl-mike-tyson-explains-one-of-his-almost-famous-quotes-20121109_1_mike-tyson-undisputed-truth-famous-quotes. [Accessed: 04 September, 2015].

Bonaparte, N. & Herold, J.C. (trans) (1955) The Mind of Napoleon: A Choice from His Written and Spoken Words Edited and Translated by J. Christopher Herold. Columbia: Columbia University Printing.

Bonaparte, N., Law, H.East. & Rhodes, C.L. (trans) (1916) Napoleon: In His Own Words. Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co.

Burke, Due east. & Project Gutenberg. (2013) Selections from the Speeches and Writings of Edmund Burke: Moral of History. Available from Earth Wide Web: http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/3286/pg3286.txt. [Accessed: 07 September, 2015].

Cambridge Dictionaries Online (2015a) Certainty. Available from Www: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/lexicon/english/certainty. [Accessed: 05 September, 2015].

Cambridge Dictionaries Online (2015b) Uncertain. Available from Www: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/uncertain?q=uncertainty. [Accessed: 05 September, 2015].

Cambridge Dictionaries Online (2015c) Confusion. Available from World wide web: http://lexicon.cambridge.org/dictionary/english language/confusion. [Accessed: 05 September, 2015].

Chandler, D.Thousand. (2009) The Campaigns of Napoleon: The Mind and Method of History's Greatest Soldier. London: Simon and Schuster.

CJCS (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) (2015) CJCS Guide 3130: Adaptive Planning and Execution Overview and Policy Framework. Available from Globe Wide Web: http://world wide web.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/g3130.pdf. [Accessed: 05 September, 2015].

Clausewitz, C. von. (2003) Principles of State of war. Dover Edition. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc.

Clausewitz, C. von., Howard, M. & Paret, P. (eds and trans) (1989) On War. Princeton, New Bailiwick of jersey: Princeton University Press.

Detzer, D. (2005) Donnybrook: The Battle of Balderdash Run, 1861. Fort Washington, PA: Harvest Books.

Dilworth, R.Fifty. & Maital, S. (2008) Fogs of State of war and Peace: A Midstream Analysis of World War Three. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Publishing Group.

Due, J., Finney, Northward. & Byerly, J. (2015) Preparing Soldiers for Uncertainty. Military Review. January-February 2015, pp.26-30.

Goerlitz, Due west. (1953) History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945. Westport, CT: Preager.

Gorman, J.C., Cooke, Northward.J. & Winner, J.L. (2006) Measuring Squad Situation Awareness in Decentralized Command and Control Environments. Ergonomics. 49(12-13), pp.1312-1325.

Hale, L.A. (1896) The Fog of War. London: Edward Stanford.

Heuser, B. (2002) Reading Clausewitz. London: Pimlico.

Kass, S. (2009) War machine Psychology: Situation Awareness. Available from Www: http://uwf.edu/skass/documents/Milpsy_situationawareness_000.ppt. [Accessed: 05 September, 2015].

Keyes, R. (2006) The Quote Verifier: Who Said What, Where, and When. New York: Griffin.

Keyes, R. (n.d.) The Quote Verifier: Who Said What, Where, and When. Available from World Wide Web: http://world wide web.ralphkeyes.com/quote-verifier/. [Accessed: 02 September, 2015].

Knowles, Eastward. (2006) What They Didn't Say: A Book of Misquotations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Martin, K. (2015) Nada is Certain but Decease and Taxes. Bachelor from World Wide Web: http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/decease-and-taxes.html. [Accessed: 08 September, 2015].

Moltke, H. von. (1900) Militarische Werke, ed. Großer Generalstab, Abteilung fur Kriegsgeschichte I, Vol. II, 2, Moltkes taktischstrategische Aufsa¨ tze aus den Jahren 1857 bis 1871. Berlin: Mittler.

Murray, S.A., Ensign, Due west., Yanagi, M. & SSC Pacific. (2010) Combat State of affairs Awareness (CSA) Model-Based Characterizations of Marine Corps Preparation and Operations. Technical Written report 1994. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA535225. [Accessed: 05 September, 2015].

Quote Investigator. (2014) History Does Not Echo Itself, Just It Rhymes. Available from World Broad Web: http://quoteinvestigator.com/2014/01/12/history-rhymes/. [Accessed: 07 September, 2015].

Riley, J.K., Endsley, One thousand.R., Bolstad, C.A. & Cuevas, H.M. (2006) Collaborative Planning and State of affairs Awareness in Ground forces Command and Command. Ergonomics. 49(12-thirteen), pp.1139-1153.

Santacroce, M.A. (2015) Joint/Interagency SMARTbook 1 – Articulation Strategic and Operational Planning: Planning for Planners. Lakeland, FL: The Lightning Press.

Santayana, G. & Project Gutenberg (2005) The Life of Reason: Volume 1, Reason in Common Sense, Chapter XII, Flux and Constancy in Human Nature. Available from Globe Wide Spider web: http://world wide web.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/15000/pg15000.txt. [Accessed: 07 September, 2015].

Scarrow, S. (2015) Britannia. London: Headline Publishing Group.

Setear, J.Thou. (1989) Simulating the Fog of War. Available from Earth Wide Web: https://world wide web.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P7511.pdf. [Accessed: 04 September, 2015].

Tsouras, P.Chiliad. (2000) The Greenhill Lexicon of Military Quotations. London: Greenhill Books.

Tzu, Southward. & Giles, 50. (trans) (2009) The Art of War by Lord's day Tzu – Archetype Collector's Edition: Includes The Archetype Giles and Total Length Translations. El Paso, Texas: El Paso Norte Press.

Wikipedia. (2014) Talk:History. Bachelor from World Broad Web: https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Talk:History. [Accessed: 07 September, 2015].

Wikipedia. (2015) Edmund Shush. Bachelor from World Wide Web: https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Edmund_Burke. [Accessed: 07 September, 2015].

Zabecki, D.T. (ed.) (2008a) Primary of Staff: The Main Officers Backside History'due south Neat Commanders: Volume ane, Napoleonic Wars to World War I. Annapolis, Medico: Naval Institute Press.

Zabecki, D.T. (ed.) (2008b) Principal of Staff: The Principal Officers Backside History's Bully Commanders: Volume 2, Earth War II to Korea and Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Establish Press.

smithvien2000.blogspot.com

Source: https://bootcampmilitaryfitnessinstitute.com/military-and-outdoor-fitness-articles/no-plan-survives-contact-with-the-enemy/